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Abstract 
Previous work has argued that young children do not answer 
counterfactual questions (e.g. “what would have happened?”) 
by constructing simulations of alternative possibilities in the 
way adults do. Here, we propose that children can engage in 
simulation when answering these questions, but consider 
different counterfactual possibilities than adults. While most 
previous research has relied on narrative stimuli, we use causal 
perception events, which are understood even in infancy. In 
Experiment 1, we replicate earlier findings that children 
struggle with counterfactual reasoning, but show that they are 
capable of conducting the required simulations in a prediction 
task. In Experiment 2, we use a novel multiple-choice method 
that allows us to study not only when children get it right, but 
also how they get it wrong. We find evidence that 4-year-olds 
engage in simulation, but preserve only some features of what 
actually happened and not others. 
Keywords: causality; counterfactual reasoning; perception; 
child development; multinomial process trees 
Introduction 
When considering whether some event C caused another 
event E, we do not merely consider events as they actually 
unfolded. Rather, we think about what could or would have 
happened had C been altered in some way (Byrne, 2016; 
Lewis, 1973). This capability for counterfactual reasoning is 
an essential, and perhaps even automatic, feature of causal 
cognition (Gerstenberg, Peterson, Goodman, Lagnado, & 
Tennenbaum, 2017), with a variety of consequences. For 
example, the relevance of different counterfactual 
possibilities affects causal judgments (Phillips, Luguri, & 
Knobe, 2015; Icard, Kominsky, & Knobe, 2017; Phillips & 
Kominsky, 2017), counterfactual reasoning undergirds 
emotions, like regret and relief (Beck & Riggs, 2014), and is 
an implicit component of Bayesian causal learning (Pearl, 
2000).  
One of the essential properties of counterfactual reasoning 
is simulation. When people engage in counterfactual 
reasoning, they construct a mental model of the events as they 
actually happened, and then imagine how the events would 
have unfolded if something about the situation had been 
different. This mental simulation is guided by a causal model 
of the situation which dictates the consequences of 
counterfactual interventions (e.g., Sloman & Lagnado, 2005).    
The developmental origins of counterfactual reasoning in 
the human mind remain a challenging mystery to cognitive 
science. Piaget held that counterfactual reasoning emerged in 
the developmental stage of “formal operations”, starting at 
about 12 years of age (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). Later work 
found that children as young as 3 could answer certain 
counterfactual questions correctly. For example, presented 
with a story about a girl named Carol who walked across a 
floor with dirty shoes, 3-5-year-olds who were asked “what 
would have happened if Carol had taken her shoes off?” 
correctly answered the floor would be clean (Harris, German, 
& Mills, 1996). 
However, later work suggested that children may arrive at 
such answers without engaging in counterfactual simulation, 
and simply rely on conditional reasoning instead. In general, 
dirty shoes make floors dirty, while clean shoes leave floors 
clean (Rafetseder, Schwitalla, & Perner, 2013). However, 
basic conditional reasoning and counterfactual reasoning 
come apart in situations in which the outcome is causally 
overdetermined. When an outcome was overdetermined, this 
means that there were multiple individually sufficient causes 
such that the outcome would still have come about even if 
one (or more) of the causes hadn’t occurred. For example, if 
both Carol and Max walk across the kitchen floor with dirty 
shoes, and children and adults are asked what would have 
happened if Carol had taken her shoes off, adults say the floor 
would still have been dirty (because of Max), whereas 5-year-
olds overwhelmingly say the floor would have been clean. 
Remarkably, 10-year-olds responded at chance, and adult-
like performance emerged only around 14 years of age 
(Rafetseder et al. 2013). 
Recent work has, again, been more optimistic about 
children’s counterfactual reasoning abilities. When narratives 
are replaced by simple “blicket detector” causal systems in 
which only some blocks (called “blickets”) can make a 
machine go, children show above-chance success for 
overdetermined outcomes around age 6 (Gopnik & Sobel, 
2000), or even at age 4-5 (Nyhout & Ganea, 2019). 
However, we believe that what it means to succeed in 
counterfactual reasoning needs to be examined more closely. 
In the research to date, researchers have generally concluded 
that the reason why children answer these questions 
incorrectly, is because they do not simulate counterfactual 
alternatives, but instead arrive at their answers by some other 
reasoning strategy (Rafeteseder et al., 2013; Nyhout & 
Ganea, 2019). This is remarkable given that other work has 
found that children are quite adept at simulation when making 
predictions about events that have not yet occurred (Atance 
& O’Neill, 2005). Given that children can engage in 
simulation in some cases, and that adults naturally do so when 
answering causal questions (Gerstenberg et al., 2017), the 
assumption that young children fail to reason 
counterfactually because they do not engage in 
counterfactual simulation at all is worth re-examining. 
There is another possible reason for why children respond 
differently than adults: Rather than failing to simulate, they 
instead simulate different counterfactual alternatives than 
 adults do. This proposal aligns with a recent proposal that 
young children may consider a broader hypothesis space than 
adults do when engaging in causal reasoning (Gopnik et al., 
2017). Similar to how children may be more flexible in what 
hypotheses they consider in causal reasoning, it is possible 
that they also consider different possibilities than adults do, 
when simulating counterfactuals. Here, we are interested to 
see whether there is systematicity in the way in which 
children consider counterfactual possibilities. When children 
get the answer to a counterfactual questions wrong, are they 
just randomly guessing, or may they systematically consider 
different possibilities than adults do? Characterizing such 
potential systematicity could give unique insight into the 
development of counterfactual reasoning, and a deeper 
understanding of what features of an event children consider 
mutable (Byrne, 2016).  
In order to examine which specific counterfactual 
possibilities children consider, we depart from the narrative 
studies that have been used in most prior work. Narrative 
stimuli add a great deal of memory load and room for 
influence from idiosyncratic knowledge. The ideal stimuli 
would be a causal event that children understand nearly 
effortlessly, that they can see in full while answering a 
counterfactual question, and which offers the opportunity to 
ask not just whether they are simulating counterfactual 
alternatives, but which specific alternatives they consider. 
Simple physical interactions that fall under the category of 
“causal perception” perfectly fit these criteria. Events in 
which one object appears to collide with another and cause it 
to move are perceived as causal by 6 months of age (Leslie & 
Keeble, 1987; Saxe & Carey 2006; Kominsky et al., 2017), 
and recent work has used these events to demonstrate 
counterfactual simulation in causal judgment with adults 
(Gerstenberg et al., 2017). 
In the current work, we present two experiments 
investigating the development of counterfactual simulation, 
using causal perception events. In Experiments 1a and 1b, we 
replicate previous findings that children struggle with 
counterfactual reasoning in overdetermined cases, but in the 
domain of causal perception events. However, we also find 
that children are highly accurate when making predictions 
about these events, showing that they are able, in principle, 
to conduct the necessary simulations to answer the questions 
correctly. 
In Experiment 2, we present children with concrete 
counterfactual alternatives to causal perception events in a 
multiple-choice answer format similar to that employed by 
Rafetseder and Perner (2018). This response format allows us 
to examine not only whether children engage in 
counterfactual simulation, but which specific counterfactual 
possibilities they consider.  
Experiment 1a 
The goal of this experiment was to validate the domain of 
causal perception in the study of children’s counterfactual 
judgments, by having children make counterfactual 
judgments about  simple causal perception events. 
Methods 
Participants We planned to run 40 children in each age 
group (20 in each of two conditions), and continued 
collecting data until we had reached that target, replacing any 
participants that were excluded (see below). 40 5-6-year-olds 
(15 female), 40 7-8-year-olds (15 female), and 40 9-10-year-
olds (18 female) participated in Experiment 1a, recruited 
from local schools and children’s museums. In addition, 10 
5-6-year-olds (5 female), 3 7-8-year-olds (2 female) and 1  
(male) 9-10-year- old participated but were excluded from 
analyses based on predetermined exclusion criteria (see 
below). 
Stimuli and procedure We constructed simple animations 
modeled on those used by Gerstenberg et al. (2015) (see Fig. 
1, videos of the animations can be found here: 
http://osf.io/qwphr/). In these animations, there are two balls, 
A and E, a red area that was described as a “goal”, and black 
walls on either side of the goal. The stimuli were animated 
.gif files placed into a Qualtrics survey (Qualtrics, 2005). The 
survey was presented on an iPad. 
All participants first saw two training items in 
counterbalanced order. In one training item, ball A hit ball E, 
which then bounced off the wall above the goal. In the other 
training item, ball A hit ball E, which then went into the goal. 
Following each training trial, participants were asked two 
questions: “Before ball A hit ball E, was ball E moving or 
sitting still?”, and “Did ball E go into the goal?” Participants 
could verbally respond and the experimenter would record 
their answer, or older children could select the option on the 
iPad directly. If participants answered either question 
incorrectly on one of the training trials, they were shown that 
training animation a second time and asked again. 
Participants then saw one of two test trials, between-
subjects. In the “difference-making” condition, the animation 
was almost identical to the training item in which ball E 
bounced off the wall above the goal, except that there was a 
“brick wall” (see Fig. 1) that ball E bounced off of, and ball 
E went into the goal. In the “overdetermined” condition, the 
animation was almost identical to the training item in which 
the ball went into the goal, except that the ball bounced off 
the brick wall before going into the goal, thus leaving the 
outcome unchanged.  
Following the test trial, participants were asked the same 
two questions as in the training trials. If children answered 
either question incorrectly, they were not corrected but their 
data were excluded. Then, children were asked the critical 
test question: “What if the brick wall had not been there? 
Would ball E have gone into the goal?”  
Results and discussion 
Results can be found in Fig. 2. A simple inspection of this 
figure gives a clear sense of the results, which were similar 
across all age groups: Near-perfect performance on cases in 
which the brick wall made a difference (where the correct 
answer is that ball E would not have gone into the goal), but 
only roughly 50% accuracy for overdetermined events 
(where the correct answer is that ball E would still have gone 
 into the goal). A logistic regression with age group and 
condition as factors revealed a main effect of condition, ß = 
2.54, p = .02, but no effect of age group and no interactions, 
p > .9. As children demonstrated nearly uniform perfect 
performance in the difference-making condition (one 
incorrect answer in total), no further analyses were conducted 
for this condition. For the overdetermined condition, a 
logistic regression with age group also showed no effect of 
age (p > .3) and no significant intercept (p = .37), indicating 
that accuracy did not differ from chance (i.e., .5).  
These results are very similar to many earlier results 
investigating children’s counterfactual reasoning (e.g., 
Rafetseder et al., 2013): Children can answer counterfactual 
questions when the correct answer changes the outcome, but 
struggle in overdetermined cases. One reason for this could 
be that children are unable to successfully simulate the 
required counterfactual possibility in these causal perception 
events. Experiment 1b tested this hypothesis by asking 
children to make predictive simulations about these very 
events, without the brick wall. 
Experiment 1b 
In this experiment, we wanted to see whether children are 
capable of correctly predicting what will happen after the 
animation is paused. It is possible that children failed to 
answer the counterfactual question correctly in the 
overdetermined situation because they have trouble 
simulating what would have happened in this case. 
Methods 
Participants This study was stopped early due to the fact that 
all children responded correctly. Our final sample sizes were 
therefore 21 5-6-year-olds (10 female) and 26 7-8-year-olds 
(14 female) recruited from the same populations as 
Experiment 1a. In addition, 4 5-6-year-olds (2 female) and 1 
(male) 7-8-year-old were excluded based on predetermined 
exclusion criteria (see below). 
Stimuli and procedure The stimuli were similar to 
Experiment 1a with the following differences: Participants 
first saw four training trials in random order: Two in which 
ball E went into the goal and two in which it missed the goal. 
First, children saw an animation where ball A struck ball E, 
and ball E moved approximately halfway from its starting 
position to the left edge of the display (where the wall and 
goal are located). At this point the animation froze and a large 
“pause” icon appeared (that didn’t obstruct either of the 
balls). Children were then asked, “If ball E keeps going, will 
it go into the goal?” Children could respond “yes” or “no”. 
For the training trials, children then saw the rest of the 
animation. If children made incorrect predictions on at least 
two of these items, they were excluded from analyses on the 
basis that they did not understand the task. 
Following training, children saw two test trials, a 
“difference-making” trial and an “overdetermined” trial in 
counterbalanced order. The test trials were identical to those 
used in Experiment 1a, with two exceptions: First, the brick 
wall was not visible (i.e., identical to Experiment 1a’s 
training trials). Second, the animation paused on the frame in 
which the ball would have collided with the brick wall in 
Experiment 1a (participants had no way of knowing this). 
Participants were then asked the same question as in the 
training items, but were not shown the end of the animation. 
Note that the predictions that children are asked to make in 
Experiment 1b are identical to the counterfactual simulation 
that is required to answer what would have happened without 
the brick wall in Experiment 1a. 
Results and discussion 
Every single child who passed the training provided correct 
answers to both test questions (21/21 5-6-year-olds and 26/26 
7-8-year-olds). We report no statistical tests because the 
uniformity of these responses renders such tests 
uninformative. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1b showed that, in line with prior work, children 
are capable of engaging in the kind of physical simulation 
that is required to answer counterfactual questions correctly, 
but did not do so consistently for the overdetermined item in 
Experiment 1a. This result suggests that children’s 
counterfactual reasoning about causal perception stimuli is 
similar to their reasoning in other domains. However, we 
 
Figure 1. Example stimuli from Experiment 1a. In the 
difference-making event (left), the brick wall altered ball 
E’s trajectory such that it went into the goal. In the 
overdetermined condition (right), ball E also deflects of 
the wall, but would have gone into the goal regardless. 
 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of accurate responses to the 
counterfactual question in Experiment 1a.  
 
 cannot tell based on these findings why children sometimes 
get it wrong. One explanation is like that proposed by 
Rafetseder et al. (2013): Children did not engage in 
simulation at all when asked to consider the counterfactual 
question. While this is still possible, given that they are 
obviously capable of engaging in simulation, we must ask 
why.  
One possibility is that children cannot simulate while 
holding the event as it actually occurred in mind (Beck & 
Riggs, 2014). For example, a correct answer in Experiment 
1a requires mentally rewinding the animation and then 
simulating what would have happened without the brick. The 
corresponding prediction in Experiment 1b is simpler 
because the brick is not present in the scene, the clip is 
paused, and it only requires children to simulate the future 
without the need to go back in time.  
An alternative is that the wording of the question 
influenced children’s performance. Notably, we found a 
pattern that aligns more closely with Rafetseder et al. (2013) 
than more recent work (Nyhout & Ganea, 2019; Rafetseder 
& Perner, 2018). One key difference between our study and 
that of Nyhout and Ganea (2019) is that the question in 
Nyhout and Ganea was “would [outcome] still [have 
happened]?” (emphasis added). While a systematic 
investigation is necessary, children may sometimes be 
answering on the basis of pragmatic cues: Why ask “would 
the outcome have been different” if the outcome was 
unchanged? 
A second, not mutually exclusive alternative is that 
children did engage in simulation, but considered different 
counterfactual possibilities than adults did. We explore this 
possibility in Experiment 2 using a multiple-choice task 
modeled on Rafetseder and Perner (2018). We hypothesized 
that children may arrive at the wrong answer because they 
hold some of the features of the actual event constant, but 
allow other features to vary in ways that adults and older 
children do not. Based on pilot data, we predicted that 
children will specifically maintain the point of origin of a 
ball’s movement from the event they saw, much as we would 
expect adults to, but allow the initial trajectory of the ball to 
vary, which we would not expect adults to do.  
Methods 
Participants We pre-registered (https://osf.io/qn3b9) a 
planned sample size of 24 participants in each of three age 
groups: 4-year-olds, 5-year-olds, and 6-year-olds. We 
therefore recruited 24 4-year-olds (15 female), 24 5-year-
olds (7 female) and 24 6-year-olds (8 female). In addition, 6 
4-year-olds (2 female) and 2 (female) 5-year-olds 
participated but were excluded due to failing to complete the 
study (4) or parental interference (3; see below). Participants 
were recruited from TheChildLab.com (Sheskin & Keil, 
2018). 
 
Stimuli and apparatus Children saw a total of ten trials in 
which featured animated events, and then still images 
representing what actually occurred in the animation, as well 
as four counterfactual possibilities (see Fig. 3; Full stimuli are 
available online at https://osf.io/5jw6y/). 
Animated events were constructed using Flash, converted 
to a movie format, embedded in a PowerPoint presentation, 
and presented over a videoconferencing system. The 
animations were slightly modified from Experiment 1. This 
time, there was only one ball, resembling a soccer ball, and 
the brick wall was replaced with a triangular wedge with a 
wood texture. The background was made green with a white 
line to mimic a soccer field. The goal was turned into a grey 
rectangle, and there were no walls on either side of it. 
We created a total of eight test animations and two training 
animations. In all test animations, the ball entered the stage 
from the right side and moved in a perfectly horizontal 
trajectory. In six of the test animations, the ball deflected off 
of the wedge, which did (4 animations) or did not (2) change 
whether it went into the goal. In two other test animations, 
the ball did not interact with the wedge, and simply moved 
across the field in a straight line. 
Along with each test animation, we made a still image that 
showed the entire trajectory the ball had taken (center, Fig. 
3), which was visible while the child was answering the 
counterfactual question, thus eliminating memory load. In 
addition, we constructed still images representing four 
counterfactual possibilities for each animation (Fig. 3). In 
these counterfactual possibilities, the wedge was removed, 
and the complete trajectory of the ball was shown as in the 
still image of the actual event. These four possibilities were 
constructed in systematic ways for the six items in which the 
ball interacted with the wedge. 
• “Correct” (red): In this image, the ball is shown moving 
horizontally across the entire field, starting from the 
same point of origin that it had in the actual animation. 
In other words, it preserved both the origin and the initial 
trajectory of the ball. 
• “Match origin” (yellow): The ball started from the same 
point of origin, but had a diagonal trajectory, ultimately 
ending up in the exact same place as the ball ended up in 
the actual event, in which it deflected off the wedge. This 
option preserved the origin but not the trajectory of the 
actual event. 
• “Match trajectory” (purple): The ball originated from a 
y-coordinate that was level with where the ball ended in 
the actual animation, and the ball moved across the 
whole field in a perfectly horizontal trajectory. This 
option preserved the initial trajectory but not the origin 
of the actual event.  
•  “Match neither” (blue): The ball started from the same 
place as it did in the “match trajectory” image, but had a 
diagonal trajectory ending in the same place as the 
“correct” image, thus matching neither the point of 
origin nor the initial trajectory of the actual event.  
For the events in which the ball and wedge did not interact, 
the four images still contained two options that preserved the 
origin and two that preserved the trajectory, but because the 
 ball did not deflect off the wedge in the actual event, the 
“match origin” and “match trajectory” images in fact showed 
the ball ending up in a location that was not present in the 
original event, while the “correct” and “match neither” 
images did. The model we used to analyze children’s 
responses (described below) therefore does not apply to these 
images. 
In addition, there were two training animations, one in 
which the ball bounced off the wedge and one in which it did 
not interact with the wedge. In both training animations, the 
ball entered on a diagonal trajectory. No still image of the 
event was presented in the center of the response screen, and 
in the still images for training items, the wedge was still 
present, as the training task was matching the actual event 
rather than considering a counterfactual one. 
Procedure The script can be found in the presenter notes of 
the PowerPoint presentations at http://osf.io/5jw6y/ 
After parents gave informed consent, children were first 
shown the two training animations, and after each one asked 
to find the image that matched what they saw from the four 
possibilities. This was primarily to familiarize children with 
the multiple-choice response method. For test trials, children 
were asked “If there were no block on the field, how would 
the ball have moved?” 
The experimenter was blind to what the child was seeing at 
all times, and only recorded the color that they said. 
Children’s responses were then transcribed by another coder 
who was blind to condition, and later matched to images 
based on the condition the child had been assigned to (see 
data files in repository). There were two exclusion criteria: If 
the child failed to finish the study for any reason, or if the 
parent interfered in a way that guided the child toward a 
specific answer on any item, in the opinion of the 
experimenter or coder. As both were blind to what the child 
was seeing, these judgments could not be influenced by 
knowing what option the child was selecting. 
Analysis plan We focused on the six test items in which the 
ball collides with the wedge. For those items, we used a 
multinomial processing tree (MPT) model (Riefer & 
Batchelder, 1988) to model the proportions with which the 
different age group chose the four possible response options, 
P(C) (= “Correct”), P(O) (= “match origin”), P(T) (= “match 
trajectory”), and P(N) (= “match neither”). Our model has 
three free parameters, 𝒔, 𝒎𝒐, and 𝒎𝒕, which each represent 
the (conditional) probability of reaching a specific discrete 
cognitive processing stage (e.g., 𝒔 = probability of engaging 
in simulation). In addition, our model allowed for the 
possibility of unbiased guessing.  
The first parameter (s) represents the probability whether 
the children engage in simulation or not. If they do not (with 
probability 1–s), we assume children simply make an 
unbiased guess for one of the four response categories (i.e., 
the conditional probability of choosing any one response 
category is .25). We assume that this will be unbiased as the 
multiple-choice question lacks the pragmatic demands of the 
questions used in previous studies. In case children engage in 
simulation (with probability s), we assume two further 
(unordered) processing steps: how likely they are to maintain 
the origin from the actual world in their simulation 
(parameter 𝑚&), and how likely they are to maintain the 
trajectory (parameter 𝑚')? In order to examine this, we 
ignore the cases in which the ball does not interact with the 
block. For the remaining six cases, we can enumerate how the 
four different response categories follow from the assumed 
processes. For example, if children maintain both the origin 
and the trajectory (with probability 𝑚& ×𝑚'), they will 
provide the correct response. If, however, children only 
maintain the origin, but not the trajectory (with probability 𝑚& × (1 −𝑚')), they will choose the “match origin” 
response option, 𝑃(𝑂). Analogous arguments can be made 
for 𝑃(𝑇) and 𝑃(𝑁). Thus, the following model equations are 
assumed to hold:  
 𝑃(𝐶) = 𝑠 ×𝑚& ×𝑚' + (1 − 𝑠) × 0.25	𝑃(𝑂) = 𝑠 ×𝑚& × (1 −𝑚') + (1 − 𝑠) × 0.25	𝑃(𝑇) = 𝑠 × (1 −𝑚&) ×𝑚' + (1 − 𝑠) × 0.25	𝑃(𝑁) = 𝑠 × (1 −𝑚&) × (1 −𝑚') + (1 − 𝑠) × 0.25 
 
 
Figure 3. Example item from Exp. 2, as a child would see 
it. The center image is a rendering of the video the child 
just watched. On this trial, red is “correct”, yellow is 
“match origin”, purple is “match trajectory”, and blue is 
“match neither”. 
 
 
Figure 4. Results of Exp. 2. Proportion of responses is on 
the y-axis, and chance responding is indicated at 25%. 
 
 To obtain estimates of the model parameters s, mo, and mt, 
we fitted the model to the aggregated data using maximum-
likelihood estimation. This provides us with a model-based 
estimate of how likely each age group is engaging in 
simulation, and the likelihood, in each age group, of 
maintaining the origin and the trajectory of the actual world.  
Note that, although the model is saturated (i.e., three free 
parameters for three independent data points provided by the 
multinomial distribution with four categories), it cannot 
account for any possible data pattern. That is, our model 
imposes testable constraints on the data. For example, it 
predicts that, after accounting for the proportion of unbiased 
guessing, the conditional ratio of 𝑃(𝐶)/𝑃(𝑂) must be equal 
to the conditional ratio 𝑃(𝑇)/𝑃(𝑁). Therefore, finding that 
the model adequately accounts for the data (i.e., it fits the 
data), provides some evidence for the underlying 
assumptions and validity of the interpretations associated 
with the parameters.  
Results and discussion 
Fig. 4 shows how often children chose each of the four 
options for the six test items where the ball collided with the 
wedge. For the two cases in which the ball and wedge did not 
interact, the correct answer was the modal response in every 
age group (4-year-olds: 50%; 5-year-olds: 71%; 6-year-olds: 
88%). 
A visual inspection of the figure suggests a clear pattern 
when it comes to choosing the correct answer: Above-chance 
performance emerges around age 6. However, it also appears 
that, of the three possible incorrect responses, all age groups 
preferred “match origin” over “match trajectory” and “match 
neither”, which suggests that the younger children are not just 
guessing randomly. Rather, they are simulating possibilities 
that maintain the origin but not the trajectory of the ball in the 
actual event. 
To verify this impression, we fit our MPT model to 
children’s responses. As our model was saturated, we used a 
double bootstrap procedure (van de Schoot, Hoijtink, & 
Dekovic, 2010) to evaluate model fit. This approach revealed 
a p-value of .04 (𝐺< = 3.48) for the 4-year olds and .05 
(𝐺< = 2.66) for the 5-year-olds, suggesting that the main 
patterns in the data were well accounted for, but there was 
some misfit. Specifically, the model cannot predict both 𝑃(𝐶) < 𝑃(𝑂) and 𝑃(𝑇) > 𝑃(𝑁) at the same time, as was 
observed in the data. One possible reason for this misfit is 
individual differences in the simulation behavior of the 4- and 
5-year-olds, such that some individual children consistently 
responded in a particular way and others did not.  For 6-year-
olds, the fit was perfect (𝐺< = 0). Given the small magnitude 
of misfit, the model is interpretable, and we can evaluate the 
likelihood that children engaged in simulation, and how.  
The parameter estimates for each parameter in each age 
group, with 95% confidence intervals estimated by 
parametric bootstrapping, can be seen in Fig. 5. In short, we 
find little evidence for developmental change in mo or s, but 
a clear developmental increase in the estimate of mt. Put in 
plain terms, this analysis suggests that 4- and 5-year-olds 
were not significantly different from 6-year-olds or each 
other in their likelihood of engaging in simulation, nor in how 
likely they were to choose an option that maintained the ball’s 
point of origin from the actual event. However, 6-year-olds 
were significantly more likely than younger children to 
maintain the ball’s initial trajectory from the counterfactual 
event. In addition, for 6-year-olds we have considerably 
smaller CIs for s, indicating we that we have higher certainty 
that they engage in simulation most of the time. 
In short, children ages 4-5 do seem to engage in 
counterfactual simulation, and systematically hold constant 
some, but not all, features of the actual world in those 
counterfactual simulations, while allowing other features of 
the world (which older children hold constant) to vary.  
General Discussion 
In two experiments, we provide evidence that young children 
engage in counterfactual simulation, but do so in a different 
way than older children and adults. Experiment 1 validated 
the stimuli by replicating previous findings about children’s 
ability to answer counterfactual questions and conduct 
predictive simulations, but in the domain of causal 
perception. Experiment 2 asked children to choose among 
four counterfactual trajectories rather than answering a 
simple yes/no question, and found that when 4-5-year-old 
children engage in simulation, they consider counterfactual 
possibilities in which the origin of an object’s motion is 
preserved while its initial trajectory is allowed to vary, while 
6-year-olds are more likely to preserve both features in their 
counterfactual simulations. 
We consider these findings in the context of a general 
theory of children’s reasoning put forward by Gopnik et al. 
(2017): When reasoning about different possibilities, 
children’s hypothesis space may be quite different from 
adults, but the basic process of simulation could be very 
similar. In particular, this theory suggests that children have 
a broader and “flatter” hypothesis space (i.e., priors across all 
hypotheses are similar), in which they conduct a “higher-
temperature” (i.e., broader) search. This theory can be readily 
applied to children’s struggles with counterfactual reasoning: 
When considering counterfactual possibilities, children may 
be sampling from a broader set of possibilities, none of which 
 
Figure 5. MPT model parameter estimates for s, mo, and 
mt in each age group. Error bars are bootstrapped 95% CIs. 
 
 are favored over the others, and the way they pick 
possibilities out of this space is more random. 
However, unlike Gopnik et al. (2017), we find that children 
are only showing evidence of this broader search space for 
certain specific features of these events. In other words, while 
our results align with the general proposal that children 
conduct simulations over a “flatter” hypothesis space, the 
space is only flatter over certain “dimensions” (i.e., 
components) of the events being considered. In this case, 
children are unlikely to consider possibilities that change 
where the ball enters from, but between 4 and 6 they narrow 
the search space for the initial trajectory of the object to be 
more like adults’. 
This is a critical advance for understanding children’s 
reasoning. We must not only test whether they are searching 
a broader space of possibilities in general, but also identify 
the separate features of that hypothesis space and determine 
which aspects of the event-structure are treated in an adult-
like way (in this case the point of origin of the object’s 
motion). Doing so will not only help us better understand 
children’s reasoning processes, but allow us to predict 
specific challenges they face, or errors they will make. 
One limitation is that we selected the range of possibilities 
for children to consider, and so there may be a possibility that 
we did not include which they would prefer over and above 
the ones they selected here. While verbal pragmatics are no 
longer a viable explanation, there are other possible 
explanations for children’s responses that would not rely on 
simulation, such as path similarity, or some kind of 
contextual inference about the scenario, such as whether there 
is an agent launching the ball into motion.  
This work provides an exciting new approach to the study 
of counterfactual reasoning in development. We should 
consider that “failure” in these tasks may result not from a 
failure to simulate per se but rather from different 
assumptions about what to hold constant and what to change 
when simulating counterfactuals. 
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